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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
VAUGHN L. W ARR, MARY ILE-
ENE W ARR McKOW AN, ETHEL 
\\r ARR R E E D, KATHERINE 
Wi\RR HAMILTON and EMMA 
W ARR HAMILTON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
THE VAN KLEECK-BACON IN-
VESTMENT COMPANY. and THE 
VANKLEECK MORTGAGE COM-
PANY, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
J A_ Y LARSEN, 
Appellant and Intervener. 
No. 7872 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents 
I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Early in the year 1920 The Van Kleeck Mortgage Com-
pany, a Colorado corporation, appointed an agent in the State 
of Utah for the purpose of soliciting loans. The company 
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at the time, however, did not qualify to do business in the 
State of Utah ·or appoint any process agent. On April 22, 
1920 The Van Kleeck Mortgage Company, while still· not 
qualified to do business in the State of Utah, made a loan 
to Joseph F. Warr and Elizabeth Warr, his wife, in the 
amount of $2500.00 and took as security therefore a mortgage 
on the property, which is the subject of this law suit. On the 
19th day of April, 1921 the Warrs executed a Warranty Deed 
on the property in favor of The Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment 
Company, a sister corporation of the Mortgage Company, also 
a Colorado corporation. The Investment Company never ac-
~ 
quired any interest in the note or mortgage, nor did it pay 
to the Mortgage Company any consideration for any interest 
1 in. the property covered by the mortgage, nor did . the Mortgage 
Company ever attempt or purport to transfer to the Invest-
ment Company any interest which the Mortgage Company may 
have had in said property by reason of the ·mortgage. Like-
wise, the Investment Company paid no consideration to the 
\XT arrs for the deed. 
Coincindentally with the signing of the deed to the Warrs, 
The Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment Company executed an agree-
ment to reconvey the property to the W arrs upon the payment 
to The Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment_ Company of the sum 
of $3500.00. The deed itself was recorded. The recqnveyance 
agreement was not recorded-in fact, it contained a provision 
that if it were recorded it should become null and void. 
The Van Kleeck Mortgage Company qualified to do 
business in the State of Utah on the 2nd day of May, 1921. 
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~rhe charters of both companies were revoked by the State of 
Utah for the non-payment of license fees on the 20th day of 
April, 1936, and the companies were not reinstated until 
March, 19 51. By the terms of the corporate charters in the 
office of the Secretary of State, the corporate life of both com-
panies has long since expired. No amendments extending the 
corporate life of either of these companies has ever been filed 
\Yith the Secretary of State of the State of Utah. 
On March 3, 1938 the Mortgage Company, as grantor, 
executed a contract of sale to the surface rights of said prop-
erty to· one Jay Larsen. In 1942 the Investment Company 
executed a Warranty Deed to the surface to Jay Larsen. In 
1951 the Investment Company executed a lease on the mineral 
rights in favor of the Carter Oil-Company for the consideration 
of $75,000.00. 
Between 1921 and 1951 the two companies intermittently 
had process agents appointed in the state, but during long 
periods of time there were no process agents at all. In March 
of 1951 these two companies jointly wrote to one Don Barr, 
a resident of Vernal, Utah, asking if he would serve as process 
agent. Barr wrote back that he would so serve. The companies 
thereupon informed him that he was the process agent and 
filed the necessary papers with the Secretary of State. How-
ever, they gave Don Barr no instructions of any nature what-
soever regarding his duties as progess agent, nor did they 
subsequently communicate with him regarding what he should 
do in the event process was served upon him. 
On the 31st day of July, 1951, the plaintiffs served sum-
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mons :in this action on Don Barr as process. agent for the de-
fendant companies (R. 4), having previously on the 27th 
day of June·, 1951, filed the Complaint (R.3), and recorded 
the Lis Pendens. No answer was ~ade in the time provided 
by law. Default was entered August 21, 1951 (R. 38), and 
on the 31st day of August, 1951, the plaintiffs adduced evi-
. dence and took Default Judgment (R. 5) in the action quiet-
ing title in them to the property as against The Van I(leeck 
Mortgage .Company and The Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment 
Company-. 
On the 20th day of November; 1951, the defendants, 
The Van Kle~ck Mortgage Company and The Van Kleeck-
Bacon Investment Company, filed a motion to set aside the 
default judgment (R. 9) on the grounds ((that the said. entry 
of default and said default judgment were entered and taken 
against the said defendants through and ·by reason of their 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable negledt." This 
matter was argued before the Court on the 14th day of De-
cember, 1951 and on the 26th day of April, 1952 the Court 
entered its ruling denying the motion to set aside the default 
judgment (R. 31), which ruling was docketed on the 13th day 
of May, 1952. On the 23rd day of May, 1952 the defendants 
filed another motion to set aside the default judgment (R. 32) 
on the grounds that there ·was a misjoinder of parties in that 
the plaintiffs had failed to mal<:e the owner of the surface . 
rights, Jay Larsen, a party defendant and also ~hat they had 
failed . to make Carter Oil Company a party defendant. On 
the same day, Jay Larsen filed a motion to set aside the default 
judgment and for permission to intervene in the action· (R. 
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39). On the following day, May 24, 1952, The Van Kleeck-
Bacon Investment Company filed a motion to have the court 
reconsider and set aside its ruling (R. 44) denying the de-
fendants' n1otion to set aside the default judgment on the 
grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neg-
lect. These matters were argued before the Court. During 
argument in open court, plaintiffs' counsel offered to give 
to Jay Larsen a Quit Claim Deed from plaintiffs to the sur-
face rights of all of the property concerned in this action 
(R. 56) . Larsen was not present, nor was his attorney. He 
\\·as being there represented by the same attorney represent-
ing the Van Kleeck companies, which attorney, on behalf of 
Larsen, rejected the offer of a Quit Claim Deed. All of these 
motions were denied (R. 5)) and from this denial the appeal 
now before this Court has been taken. The particular facts 
will be more fully disq~ssed in connection with the points 
-to which applicable. 
II 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
THE DEFAULT SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE UN-
DER THE ORIGINAL MOTION. 
II 
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT FOR 
NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES SHOULD BE DENIED. 
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III 
JAy LARSEN SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO 
INTERVENE. 
IV 
THE POSITION OF CARTER OIL COMPANY. 
III 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEFAULT SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE UN-
DER THE ORIGINAL MOTION. 
(a) The Default Did Not Result From Surprise, Inad-
vertence or Excusable Neglect. 
The original motion filed by the defendants and all of 
the argument directed thereto was based upon the ground that 
the default of the defendant resulted from surprise, inadvert-
ence or excusable neglect, and therefore should be set aside 
under the provisions of Rule 55 (c) and Rule 60 (b) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendants appear to have prac-
tically abandoned this argument, devoting only a few pages 
of their voluminous Brief to this matter. To insure that this 
Court will have no doubt that the court below correctly denied 
defendants' said motions, we propose to discuss the matter 
fully. 
The evidence in the record shows that the Summons was 
properly served upon the process agent at. Vernal, Utah, 
10 
r -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which the defendants had designated, Mr. Don Barr. Barr 
in his affidavit states that he had never received any instruc-
tions from the defendants as to his duties as process agent 
and that at the time he was served, the fact that he was their 
process agent had actually slipped his mind. Our statutes 
specifically provide that answer to sununons shall be made in 
20 days. If the default in this case were set aside on the 
sho,ving made, it would mean that in every case, and certain! y 
in every case concerning a non-resident corporation, the time 
to answer would not be 20 days as the rule says, but 110 
days-20 days plus the 90 days time in which to move to set 
aside a default judgment. Such is certainly not the law. 
One of the earliest cases in Utah touching this point con-
cerns a non-resident corporation and is very much in line 
\Vith the case now before the Court. This is the case of Walker 
Bros. v. Continental Insurance Company of N.Y., 2 Utah 33i1. 
In the Walker case, as in this case, summons was served on 
the agent for a non-resident corporation. The agent in the 
Walker case held the summons and did notping about it until 
it was too late for the company to answer. The evidence showed 
in the Walker case, as it shows in this case, that the company 
had never informed its resident agent as to the procedure to 
be followed if a summons were served. In the ·walker case, 
as in this case, the non-resident agent aparently never did 
read the summons to determine just what its nature was. The 
·lower court refused to set aside the default judgment and 
the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court. 
In discussing the law, the court stated: 
''There was no abuse of discretion, and the decision 
11 
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is fully jus!ied on the ground of negligence in the local 
agent, in the general agent, and in the attorney of 
appellant. 
(tHe mailed the papers to New York City, knowing 
an answer could not be drawn and received by mail 
within the remaining nine days. 
((It does not appear that he wrote, or that he informed 
the appellant when service was made; or whether he 
would or would not act in the matter; or that he even 
read the summons; or knew when the answer vvrould 
be due." · 
The Court further stated: 
((The appellant urges that its agents made a mistake 
in not deeming it his duty to protect appellant from 
default and judgment, and made an inadvertence in 
not promptly taking steps to prevent default and no-
tifying appellant by telepgraph. There is nothing in 
the affidavits to show that the agent had any instruc-
tions or authority from the appellant to protect its rights 
in the manner specified, and he himself swears that he 
was not authorized to employ counsel, and (could only 
submit the papers to the company and await their 
instructions.' He does not, therefore, appear to have 
made any mistake or inadvertence. It was the mistake 
and inadve~tence of the company, in not giving him 
authority to act for the corporation in such cases. But 
the mistake and inadvertence are not such as can be 
relieved against'' 
Although this case is an old one, it is still very much in line 
with the weight. of authority and has never been modified 
by the Supreme Court of Utah. 
12 
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The only Utah case upon which defendants rely on this 
point is the case of Utah Commercial _Bank v. Trumpow, 17 
Utah 199, which is so far different from this case· on its facts 
that it has no persuasive value. In the Trumbow case, the 
default resulted from the fact that a notice given went astray 
in the mails, and the Trumbow case holds, in line with the 
great weight of authority, that the defendant is. not chargeable 
with the failure of the United States mail and that failure 
to answer resulting from failure of the mail service is excus-
able neglect. In this case if the process agent, Barr, had actually 
mailed the papers to the defendants and the mails had failed 
to deliver them, the case would have been in line with the Truro-
bow case. Such, however, is not the fact. Barr did not even 
remember that he was process agent for the defendants and 
paid no attention to the summons served upon him. 
The California statute covering the setting aside of de- · 
fault judgments is very similar to ours and has been con-
strued by the courts of that state in numerous cases. The fol-
lowing excerpt from the California Appellate Court in the . 
case of Elms v. Elms, 164 P. (2d) 936, indicates the attitude 
of the California courts whert the mistake or negligence is 
deemed inexcusable: 
((To warrant relief under section 473 a litigant's 
neglect must have been such as might have been the 
act of a reasonably prudent person under the same 
circumstances. The inadvertence contemplated by the 
statute does not mean mere inadvertence in the ab-
stract. If it is wholly inexcusable it does not justify 
relief. Freeman on Judgments, 4th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 482; 
Shearman v. Jorgensen, 106 Cal. 483, 485, 39 P. 863. 
13 
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It is the duty of every party desiring to resist an action 
or to participate in a judicial proceeding to take timely 
and adequate steps to retain counsel or to act in his 
own person to avoid an undesirable judgment. Unless 
in arranging for his defense he shows that he has 
exercised such ·reasonable diligence as a man of ordi-
nary prudence usually bestows upon important busi-
ness his motion for relief under secion 473 will be 
denied. Freeman, 483, 5th Ed. Courts neither act as 
guardians for incompetent parties nor for those who 
are grossly careless of their own affairs. All must be 
governed by the rules in force, universally appliec;l 
according to the showing made. Gillingham v. Lav.r-
rence, 11 Cal. App., 231, 232, 105 P. 584. The lavv 
frowns upon setting aside default judgments result-
ing from inexcusable neglect of the complainant. The 
only occasion for the application of Section 473 is 
where a party is unexpectedly placed in a situation 
to his injury without fault or negligence of his own 
and against which ordinary neglect will . warrant judi-
cial relief unless it may reasonably be classified as of the 
excusable variety upon a sufficient showing. Hughes 
v. Wright, 64 C·al. App. 2d 897, 149 P. (2d) 392." 
In all of the following California cases, the trial court 
actually set aside the default judgment and the appellate 
court held that the trial court had abused its discretion in 
so doing and reinstated the default judgments. In Sharman 
v. Jorgensen, 39 Pac. 863, the attorney thought he had filed 
the Answer, but inadvertently did not do so. In Durbow v. 
Chesley, 141 P. 631, the defendant's attorney failed to file an 
appearance due to a mistaken understanding that the action 
was to be consolidated with other actions. In Ross v. San 
Diego Glazed Cement Pipe Co., 194 Pac. 1059, the attorney 
received the service of a cross-complaint and instructed his 
14 
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stenographer to place it in the files, but no further action was 
taken. 
In the follo,ving California cases, the lower court refused 
to set aside the default judgment and was sustained by the 
appellate court. In the case of Shay v. Chicago Clock Co., 
44: Pac. 23 7, the court stated the facts as follows: 
ttThe president read the papers that day, and ob-
served their date, but, without making any inquiry 
as to the time when they were served, kept them in 
his possession until after the default had been entered. 
He stated, at the hearing of the motion, that he did 
not send for his attorney, or send the papers to him, 
but kept them, thinking that his attorney would be in 
every day, and therefore waited until he should come, 
and that, when he did see him, the default had been 
entered.'' 
In Coleman v. Rankin, 37 Calif. 247, the defendant re-
ceived a copy of the summons while in attendance as a witness 1 
in court and placed it in his _hat and lost it. In Williams v. 
Cummings, 30 Pac. 762, the attorney incorrectly marked the 
date of service of summons and was late in filing_ his answer. 
In the case of Cleek v. Virginia Gold Mining & Milling 
Company, 122 P. (2d) 232, the Supreme Court of the State 
of Idaho set aside an order of the lower court vacating a de-
fault judgment using the following language: 
t (While the granting or refusing to grant a motion 
to vacate a judgment and set aside a default, where 
right to relief is based on the claim that they have 
been permitted to be taken and entered through mis-
15 
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take, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, is 
a matter which rests largely in the discretion of the 
trial judge, reference is· always had in stating that rule 
to a sound, judicial reviewable discretion, in the 
exercise of which courts must bear in mind a judg-
ment is property of which the owner must not be de-
prived without due process of law, and the mistake 
or neglect, to be sufficient, must be such as may be 
expected on the part of a reasonably prudent person 
situated as was the party against whom the judgment 
was entered. Kynaston v. Thorpe, 29 Idaho 302, 
158 P. 792; Valley State Bank v. Post Falls, etc., 29 
Idaho 587, 161 P. 242; Green v. Craney, 32 Idaho 
338, 182 P. 582." See, also, Dormer v. Stone, 27 Idaho 
279, 149 P. 505; Nelson v. McGoldrick Lumber Co., 
30 Idaho 451, 165 P. 1125; Savage v. Stokes, 54 Idaho 
109, 28 P. (2d) 900; Voellmack v. Northwestern 
M. L. Ins. Co.,. 60 Idaho 412, 92 P. {2d) 1076. 
Again the California Courts, in the case of Weinberger 
v. Manning, 123 P. (2d) 531, held that the burden of proof 
of establishing that neglect ~as excusable was on the defend-
ant. In refusing to set aside a default judgment, the court 
stated: 
nThe first question for determination under the 
cited section is whether or not there was a mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect on the 
part of defendant. If ther~ was not then she is not 
entitled to relief, notwithstanding any showing of 
merits (in support of her motion.' Bond v. Karma-Ajax 
Consol. Min Co., 15 Cal. App. 469, 472, 115 P. 254. 
The burden of proof in such a matter is upon the 
defendant and she was required to establish her claim 
of ·excusable neglect by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Bruskey v.' Bruskey, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 472, 
41 P. (2d) .203. While courts are generous in reliev-
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ing litigants of their defaults resulting from inadvert-
ence or excusable neglect yet they are not required 
to act as guardians for persons who are grossly care-
less as to their own affairs. Gillingham v. Lawrence, 
11 Cal. App. 231, 233; 105 P. 584. All persons in 
possesion of their normal facilities, capable of engag-
ing in busines transactions must conform with, and 
be guided by, the rules and regulations of legal pro-
cedure. Ibid. While the decision upon a motion to 
open a default is primarily within the discretion of 
the trial court, at the same time such discretion rna y 
not be exercised arbitrarily; it must be an (impartial 
discretion guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed 
legal principles.' Brill v. Fox, 211 Cal. 739, 297 P. 
25, 26." 
The following enlightening language is found in the 
case of Bickerstaff v. Harmonica Fire Ins. Co., 133 S.W. 2d 
890 @ 892: 
t]n the case last cited the court said: (The statute 
to vacate judgments by this proceeding is in deroga-
tion, not only of the common law, but of the very im-
portant policy of holding judgments final after the 
close of the term. Citizens must have some confidence 
in the judgments of our official ·tribunals, as settle-
ments of their controversies, and there should be some 
end of them. Unless a case be clearly within the spirit 
· and policy of the act, the judgment should not be dis-
turbed'.'' 
In the case of Bond v. W. T. Congleton Co., 129 S.W. 
2d 570 @ 573, the court stated: 
"However, this liberal attitude has never been ex-
tended to the point o( declaring that a party is en-
ttiled to have a default judgment set aside as a matter 
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of right. It is only when he shows a reasonable excuse 
and establishes that he has not been guilty of un-
reasonable delay or neglect that the discretion of the 
trial court should be exercised in setting aside a de-
fault judgment and permiting defense to be made." 
In the case of Lynch v. Arizona Enterprise Mining Co., 
179 Pac. 956 @ 95 7, the service was made on a non-resident 
agent who failed to notify his principal. Default was taken 
and the lower court set the default aside. The supreme court 
of Arizona reversed the lower court and reinstated the de-
fault judgment using the following language: 
((Can the negligence of the statutory agent in not 
notifying the defendant of the pendency of the suit 
because (he did not know the address of the company' 
be considered (excusable neglect'? We think not. It 
must be conceded that it was the duty of the agent 
to promptly forward the summons to the proper of-
ficers of the company. There is no showing that he 
made any effort to ascertain the address of any of 
the defendant's officers. Nothing of that nature is 
disclosed. It appears that the principal works of the 
company ate situated at or near Boise, in the adjoining 
county, to the one in which the agent resides. Further-
more, the statute requires that the articles. of incor-
poration organized under the laws of this state shall 
contain (the names, residences, post office addresses 
of the corporators, the name of the corporation, ~nd 
its principal place of business.' Civ. Code 1913, par. 
2100. These articles are required to be filed in the 
office of · the Arizona Corporation Commission. It is 
too plain to be questioned that, if the agent had made 
any reasonable effort to discover the address of a!ly 
officer of the company, he would have succeeded, and 
it must be held that he was cupably negligent in not 
18 
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doing so, and that his negligence was the defendant's 
negligence." 
In the recent case of Postal Benefit Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 
165 Pac. (2d) 173·, the Arizona courts went even further. In 
that case, summons \Yas served on the corporation commission 
of Arizona, which by statute was made the process agent for 
the non-resident corporation in question. The corporation 
commission failed to notify the defendant of the p~ndency 
of the suit and a default judgment was taken. The lower court 
refused to set the default aside and the Supreme Court sus-
tained the decision of the lower court. The language of the 
Arizona Supreme Court is as follows: 
((We are committed to the rule that where service 
had been made on a duly appointed statutory agent, 
and the agent failed to notify his principal, through 
mere carelessness, that such a showing does not con-
stitute (excusable neglect but was indeed inexcusable 
neglect.' Lynch v. Arizona Enterprise Min~ C'O., 20 
Ariz. 250, 179 P. 956. We believe the majority of the 
cases support this view. 31 Am. Jur. 287, Sec. 747, 
Judgments. If the statutory agent here was one by 
appointment, rather than by law,. we would be im-
pelled to follow the Lynch case. We see no reason to 
adopt a different rule where the agent has been made 
so by law rather than by appointment Under the law, 
the defendant actually appointed each member of the 
commission as its agent. Unless, therefore, th~ show-
ing made disclosed that the agents were excusable 
in failing to advise defendant of the summons, the 
court properly denied the application to set aside the 
judgment. The record is barren of any legal excuse 
on the part of the commission. It appears that the 
summons was placed in the files of the commission, 
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. ' 
and nothing further done about it. This is no justifiable 
excuse or neglect. Lynch v. Arizona Enterprise Co., 
supra; Gutierrez v. Romero, 24 Ariz. 382, .210 P. 
470; Garden Dev. Co. v. Carlow, 33 Ariz. 232, 263, 
P. 623, 625; Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Ellis, 
53 Okl. 264, 156 P. 226, L.R.A. 1916E, 100; Gordon 
v. Harbolt, Cal .App. 280 P. 701; Larson v. Zabroski, 
21 Wash. (2d) '572, 152, P. 2d 154 rehearing 155 P. 
2d 184." 
In the case of Penn Central Light & Power Co. v. Central 
Eastern Power Co., 171 A. 332 @ 335, the defendant failed 
to answer and cited the failure of its process agent to bring 
the service of summons to its attention as a basis to set aside 
the default judgment taken. The court refused to set aside the 
default judgment ·and quoted in support of its refusal Freeman 
on Judgments. The language of -the Pennsylvania Court is 
as follows: 
((The defendant is a citizen of the State of Delaware. 
The statute requires it to have a resident agent upon 
whom process may b~ served. It appointed such agent. 
Service upon the resident agent is as complete and 
valid as if the service had been made upon the Presi-
dent or other head officer. 
~~To hold otherwise . would be to destroy the effect 
and meaning of section 48 of the Corporation Law 
(as amended by 34 Del. Laws, c. 112, Sec. 12). 
((It would be the same, if the defendant were a foreign 
corporation and service of process • had been made 
upon its statutory agent. 1 Freeman on Judgments, 
Sec. 346." 
In Freeman on Judgments, Vol. 3, Sec. 1204, in treating 
of equitable relief, it is said: 
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((Consequently even an inequitable judgment will 
not be set aside nor will its enforcement be enjoined 
''rhere it was the result of the complaining party's 
fault or inexcusable neglect. To entitle a party to relief, 
he must not only show the fraud, mistake or other 
ground for equitable interference, but it must appear 
that he \Yas not negligent in failing to discover the 
real facts in time to prevent the judgment. This prin-
ciple of diligence is as applicable to a party's agent 
and representative in the action as to the party him-
self. Thus, a judgment against an infant will not be 
set aside merely because of the neglect of his guardian 
ad litem "rhere there was no fraudulent or collusive 
act by the plaintiff. The same ·is true with respect to 
the neglect of a trustee of a school district. And the 
failure of a corporate agent upon whom service was 
legally made to inform the executive officers of the 
defendant of the fact, because of his unwarranted 
assumption that the service was ineffective, is negli-
gence which defeats relief." 
The same rule prevails in the Federal Court. In Traveler's 
Protective Assn. v. Gilbert (C.C.A.) 11 F. 269, 275, 55 
L.R.A. 5 38, summons was served on the secretary of the 
corporation. The secretary of the corporation informed the 
marsal that he, the secretary, was not the proper person to 
be served, but that the marshal should s.erve the President 
of the association. The secretary assumed that he, the marshal, 
would follow his directions. The marshal did no such thing, 
but filed the return on the basis of the service on the · secre-
tary. Default was taken. The appellate court refused to dis-
turb the finding of the lower court that the default judgment 
should not be vacated. The following is the language of the 
appellate court: 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ccwe are also of the opinion that the misapprehen-
sion claimed to exist on the part of Secretary Bass was 
not such as justified him in not infonning the proper 
executive officers . of the pendency of the suit. Even 
if he did think the Marshal would take his advice, 
and serve some other person, he, with the/ copy of the 
summons in his possession, was not justified in the 
misapprehension claimed for him. He was clearly 
negligent in not apprising his superior officers of the 
service as made, and the association, being respon-
sible for his negligence, cannot resort to a court of 
eqt;tity for relief.~' 
In the case of S. B. Reese Lumber Co. v. Licking Coal & 
Lumber Co., 161 SW 1124 @ 1126, summons was served on 
the statutory agent who failed to notify his principal. That 
court -also refused to set aside the default judgmen-t. The 
court stated in its opinion: 
c cThough Cook's denial that such advice was given 
to him by Nesbitt or that he made the reply attributed 
to him by the latter; and that of appellant's vice-
president and manager, S. B. Reese, that notice of 
the service of the summons was ever given appellant 
by/Cook, be accepted as, the truth of ;the matter, it 
would merely show that Cook was negligent in failing 
to inform appellant of the service of the ·summons 
upon him, and, this being so, appellant cannot rely 
upon the negligence of its agent as gro~nd for vacat-
ing the judgment rendered against it after being prop-
erly summoned in this action. In such a state of case 
the negligent of th agent is imputed to the. principal, 
and is, therefore, the negligence of the latter. In 
other words, the absence ·of actual knowledge . by 
_appellant of the service of the summons upon its 
agent of the pendency of the action, though it ·may 
have prevented it from. making defense to the ac-
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tion, \Yas not such an unavoidable casualty or mis· 
fortune in the meaning of sub-section 7, Sec. 518 
Civil Code, as entitles it to a vacation of the judgment 
or a new trial. Beasley et al v. Furr, 154 Ky. 286, 157 
s.w. 10." 
In the case of San Antonio Paper Co. v. Morgan, 53 S.W. 
(2d) 651 @ 653, the appellate court again upheld the dis-
cretion of the trial court in refusing to set aside a default judg-
ment. The following excerpt is taken from the appellate 
court's decision: 
((The question of setting aside a default judgment 
is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, 
and, unless that discretion has been clearly abused, 
\vhich is not the case here, an appellate court is not 
authorized to disturb the judgment. It is also settled 
law that, where one seeks to set aside a default judg-
. ment because of failure to ans.wer and defend the suit, 
he must show that neither he nor his agents were neg-
ligent in that regard, and that, where defendant f~ils 
to show a reasonable excuse for not answering the 
suit in time, it is immaterial that he alleges a meri-
torious defense thereto. Hooser v. Wolfe (Tex. Civ. 
App.)- 30 S.W. (2d) 728; Homuth v. Williams (Tex. 
Civ. App.) 42 S.W. ( 2d) 1048, and cases there cited. 
The failure of Newton to inform appellant, his em-
ployer, of the service of citation upon him until August 
28, 1931, and in telling appellant that he was served 
on that date, was negligence, and showed no reason-
able excuse for not answering the suit in time, except 
an excuse based upon the negligence of appellant's 
agent and with which negligence appellant alone is 
charged.'' 
The case of Wheat v. McNeil, 295 P. 102, although it 
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does not go directly to the negligence of a process agent, 
, I 
does go to the question of whether or not mere mistake on the 
part of a person receiving the summons. is sufficient grounds 
upon which to set aside a default judgment. In that case, 
the person receiving the summons failed to take any action 
because of the fact that he believed that it had to be served 
by _a peace officer, when in fact it was served by a private indi-
vidual. Default was taken and the Court refused to set it 
aside. In upholding this decision the appellate court stated: 
ttAs to the mistake, advertence, etc., alleged in the 
complaint, and the fraud in relation thereto, the fol-
lowing excerpt from the complaint may be recited 
as a complete answer to any grounds for relief: The 
complaint uses the following language: tThat the 
palintiff was at such time (referring to the service 
of summons) , o_f the opinion and belief that such 
summons and complaint, in order to be legal, had 
to be served upon him by a sheriff or an officer of 
the law; that at such time the plaintiff was not of 
the opinion and belief that he had been actually and 
legally served with a copy of the summons and com-
plaint in said action, or in said action at all; that be-
cause of the aforesaid facts the plaintiff, through 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, 
failed to employ the services of an attorney, and 
refrained from making any legal defense to such 
action, and suffered a default to be taken therein and 
judgment rendered against h~m'. This, of course, con-
stitutes no excuse whatever .. By his own pleading the 
appellant in this case shows that the service of sum-
mons in the personal injury action, that is, the action 
where judgment was . taken by default against the 
appellant, was had in entire accord with the provisions 
of sections 410 and 411 of the Code of Civil Pro-
d , ce ure. 
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A similar ruling was pronounced in the North Dakota 
case of Foley v. Davis, 211 N W 818, where the defendant 
failed to answer the summons because he believed it should 
have been signed by the Clerk of the Cnurt instead of by an 
attorney. The default was granted. A motion was filed to set 
aside the default which was denied, and the appellate court 
uDheld the deniaL 
.&. 
Additional cases where summons was served on a process 
agent who failed to notify his principal and where the courts 
refused to set aside the default judgment taken are: 
·George 0. Richards Co. v. Scott (an Okla. case), 
251 Pac. 482. 
Bradshaw v. Des Moines Ins. Co. (an Iowa case), 
134 N W 628. 
n18-8-·5 Disability of Noncomplying Foreign Cor-
poration. 
(b) The defendants have no meritorious defense. 
In order to have a default judgment set aside in addition 
to showing that the same was taken as a result of surprise, 
inadvertence or excusable neglect, it is necessary for the person 
~oving to set aside the judgment also to show that he has a 
meritorious defense. In the court below, the defendants took 
the position that if the answer itself stated a defense, this 
requirement of the statute was met. While this may have 
been true under the old rules of pleading which required 
great particularity, it certainly cannot be true under our present 
Rules of Civil Procedure which allow the complaint and the 
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answer to state the position of the party in a very general 
way and then provide that it may be supplemented by deposi-
tions, written interrogatories and demands for admission. All 
of these supplement the pleadings. It is the position of the 
plaintiffs that whether there is a meritorious defense depends 
upon the state of the record at the time of the hearing. The 
plaintiffs in this case took the depositions of certain officers 
of the defendant companies to supplement and explain the 
allegations in the defendants' answer. These depositions 
were before the lower court at the time this motion was argued 
and therefore should have been, and undoubtedly were, con-
sidered by the court in connection with the argument. The 
record is at the present time in such a state that- if the default 
judgment were set aside, the plaintiffs could go into court and 
move, and be entitled to, a summary judgment on the plead-
ings. Certainly when the record is in that condition, a men-
torious defense is not shown. 
Before discussing further the law of the case as it applies 
to the merits, plaintiffs would like to call the attention of the 
court to certain statements made by counsel for the defense 
in their brief. Counsel stated that it would not be equitable 
to set aside the default judgment because if the default judg-
ment is allowed to stand, the defendants would lose the money 
they advanced on the mortgage. This is not a good defense 
as it will hereafter be pointed out because of the fact that 
the mortgage has been released and was void in the first place. 
However, the court might understandably be somewhat in-
fluenced if they felt that the defendants might sustain an out-
of-pocket loss if the judgment were sustained. That is a 
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matter of equity. It is also a well established rule that one 
·who seeks equity must do equity and that one coming into a 
court of equity must come in with clean hands. The defend-
ants admit that they have leased the surface rights of the 
property and also that they have executed an oil lease with 
Carter Oil Company. However, counsel for defendants refused 
to let its witness Bray testify as to how much money they had 
actually received from the property (p. 20). The defendants 
steadfastly refused to reveal how much money they had re-
ceived from Carter Oil Company for the lease until the final 
argument before the court in June when counsel stated that 
the amount was $75,000.00. Certainly on the basis of equity, 
the defendants have been well repaid for the· $2500 which 
they loaned on the void mortgage. 
Section 18-8-1, U.C.A. 1943 requires every foreign cor-
poration to file certain instruments, articles, by-laws, accept-
ance of Utah Constitution, ~~designation of some person resid-
ing in said county upon whom all legal process may be served." 
18-8-2 requires the filing of ((each and every certificate of 
amendment of its Articles of Incorporation." Section 18-8-5, 
so far as it is pertinent, reads: 
Any foreign corporation. doing business within 
this state and failing to comply with the provi-
sions of section 18-8-1 and 18-8-2 shall not be entitled 
to the benefit of the laws of this state relating to 
corporations and shall not sue . . . . and shall not 
take, acquire, or hold title, possession or ownership 
of property, real, personal or mixed, within this state; 
and every contract, agreement and transaction what-
soever made or entered into by or on behalf of any 
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such corporation within this state or to be executed or 
performed within this state shall be wholly void on 
behalf of such corporation and its assignees and every 
person deriving any interest or title therefrom, but . 
shall be valid and enforceable against such corpora-
tion, assignee and person; . . . ." 
In our present matter the very essence of the Van Kleeck 
operations was the lending of money and the investing in 
properties for the sake of returns therefrom. The transcript 
of the deposition of Ross Bray clearly sustains our position that 
as of the time of the execution of the note and mortgage in 
1920 by Joseph Warr and his wife, the VanKleeck Mortgage 
Co. had already established in Utah at Vernal an agent for 
the carrying on of its business. This agent· was authorized to 
and did negotiate and consummate this particular mortgage 
and carried on for many years thereafter in that .capacity. The 
exact words of Ross Bray. in this respect as as follows (p. 15) : 
nQ. Did you have a field agent out there? 
A. We had a local agent in Vernal, Utah, whose name was 
John Glenn. 
Q. Would it be he thru whom these loans were made? 
A. You mean the W arr loans? 
Q. The Warr loans, yes. 
A. Mr. Glenn prepared and forwarded the application 
to the company fot the loan. 
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Q. \\'as he at that time authorized to accept applications 
for the company for loans in that area? 
A. Yes, sir." 
As this matter arose while the Compiled Laws of Utah 
1917 "·ere in force, let us review what our Supreme Court has 
said on the validity of such a note and mortgage. 
Dunn v. Utah Serum Co., 238 Pac. 245. ·This is an action 
involving the validity and foreclosing of a mortgage executed 
by the Utah Serum Co. and a counter-claim and cross-com-
plaint was raised in the litigation. The question came as to 
whether or not the said company could maintain the said 
cross-complaint that was filed by the Ft. Dodge Serum C'O. 
This latter company is a corporation organized and existing 
under the laws of the state of Iowa, which failed and neglected 
to file copies of its Articles of Incorporation, its By-laws and 
to appoint a resident agent for some 8 months after the date 
of the transaction involved in this action. It was not until 
April 16, 1923 that the said corporation qualified in Utah. 
The case at page 250 quotes the sections of the Compiled Laws 
of Utah, 1917 that are pertinent in our present litigation and 
which are in sum and substance the same as the law now in 
force, being section 18-8-1, 18-8-2 and 18-8-5 of the U.C.A. 
1943. 
In this Dunn case our Supreme Court carefully reviewed 
the previous commitments relative to the matter of the foreign 
corporation's contracts in Utah and then summarized the 
la\v at page 2 51 as follows: 
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ttThe rule to be deduced from the cases cited may 
be stated thus: Where it is made to appear that any 
foreign corporation, except an insurance corporation, 
is doing business within this state within the meaning 
of section 945, without having complied therewith, 
every contract whatsoever made or entered into by 
or on behalf of such corporation within this state, or 
which is to be executed or performed within this state, 
is wholly void on behalf of such corporation. This, 
as I understand it, is the construction of the law which 
the Court had in mind when speaking upon the subject 
in the Parker case. 
'' ( 4) The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked 
to lift this appellant out of the difficulty in which it 
finds itself. To hold that Dunn and T. D. Ryan are 
estopped, because their mortgages recite that they 
are given subject to this second mortgage, or that Dunn, 
the two Ryans, and the Utah Serum Company are 
estopped because they have received the benefits of 
the money lent and have failed to repay or to return 
the same, to plead and prove in this action, to which 
they are parties and wherein their rights are involved, 
the facts which show that appellant's contracts are 
void and that it has no right to set them up as the 
basis of a counterclaim or a cross-complaint would 
be, in practical effect, to defeat the purpose and in-
tention of the Legislature as manifested in the statute. 
Such a result cannot be sanctioned by the courts." 
A number of authorities are cited in support of this ruling 
and those- that are a variance therewith -are distinguished by 
the Court. 
It is apparent that the Van Kleeck Mortgage corporation 
had launched upon its planned course of business in Utah at 
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the time the note and mortgage were executed by plaintiffs' 
parents. It did not qualify in Utah for one year after the date 
of execution of the note and mortgage. 
. A recent Utah case construing this matter generally is 
lvfarchant v. National Reserve Company of America, 103 
Utah 530, 13l7 Pac. (2d) 331. Therein the state and federal 
cases are discussed at length as to what constitutes n doing busi-
ness" in this state and holds in essence that a foreign corpora-
tion must be engaged in a continuous course of business rather 
than· a few isolated transactions. There must be at least- some 
permanence about the presence and business transaction~ of , 
the corporation within the state. We submit that the Van. 
Kleeck operation, by its very existence in 1951 as requalified 
corporations, is evidence enough of the permanence of its ' 
activities in Utah, coupled with· the provisions of its Articles 
of Incorporation and its By~laws authorizing it to conduct a 
. mortgage loan business in Colorado and elsewhere and to 
invest in properties in C~lorado and elsewhere. The m?rtgage 
at issue was negotiated and consummated through the agency 
of Mr. Glenn at Vernal, Utah and certainly such were within 
the scope, course and purpose of the corporation's avowed 
intent. There is no requirement that we must ·show a course 
of conduct in the state pr~or to this particular mortgage as 
this was in the line of the purposes of the corporate opera-
tions subsequently carried on within the state of Utah. Mr. 
_Bray testified on deposition that the company was actively 
·engaged in business nuntil about 1930" and ((made a con-
siderable number of loans'' (p. 9) .. 
This court, therefore; should weigh· these m~tters in de-
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termining whether or not in the motion that has been filed 
to set aside the default there is a substantial or meritorious 
defense alleged by way of the proposed answer that has been 
tendered. Another very essential fact to be considered by the 
court it) conjunction with the proposed answer, is the effect 
of the deed from the W arrs to the Investment Company that 
has been referred to in the second defense. In this connection 
let us point out that in the deposition (p. 17) there is a copy 
of the agreement to reconvey the property back to ~he W arrs. 
Our Supreme Court in line with the general rul~s of law re-
lating to this matter has clearly and without equivocaton held 
that the execution of a deed, apparently full, final ·and com-
plet~ on its face, may be sho'Yn to be merely a mortgage by 
evidence, either parol or in writing, of the existence of an 
agreement to reconvey the property upon the happening of cer-
tain eyents. The primary purpose of such a holding is that 
sharp dealings such as were engaged in by these two Van 
Kleeck companies shall not preclude ordinary land owners 
in Utah from the protection to which they are entitled to in 
a mortgage transaction, including the right of foreclosure, 
defense and redemption. The case which established this rule 
ih Utah is Bybee v. Stuart, 189 Pac. (2d) 118-Weber County 
-1948. 
((A wararnty deed, absolute in form, was given by 
Oni Stuart to Claude Stuart .. A concurrent agreement 
was executed' providing that Claude Stuart would re-
convey upon payment of mortgages. and taxes and 
that he would convey to a purchaser if produced by 
Onion like terms. This action is to compel conveyance 
to such a third· party.'' 
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p. 122. n'W'here there is a written agreement between 
the parties, contemporaneous with the deed, which 
shows the deed was given for security purposes, the 
court '"ill look to the real transaction and treat it as 
a mortgage." See Brown v. Skeen, 89 Utah. 568, 58 
P. (2d) 24. 
nit is not necessary that an instrument follow the 
statutory form to be a valid mortgage. In equity, a 
deed absolute on its face may be shown by parol 
evidence to have been given for security purposes only. 
Utah is recognized as a tlien theory' state. Our Su-
preme Court has held that a mortgage does not vest 
title in the mortgagee but merely creates a lien in 
his favor. Until there is a foreclosure of the mortgage 
and sale no title vests in the mortgagee. The mort-
gagor ( Oni) retains title to the mortgaged lands 
and all that is created in favor of the mortgagee is 
a lien, a right to resort to the lands to satisfy a mort-
gage debt. 
See: In re Reynolds estate, 90 Ut. 415, 62 Pac. (2d) 
270. 
See also: )Whitley v. DeVries et al, 209 Pac. (2d) 
206." -
·This premise having been definitely established, no force 
is inherent in the claim of adverse possession that is apparently 
asserted by the proposed answer. The only legal title in the 
picture that the defendants could possibly assert is by virtue 
of the deed in 1921 to the Investment Company. No cash or 
other consideration was paid by the Investment Company to 
the Warrs (p. 16). This deed has clearly been shown to be 
only a mortgage and hance is not the basis for adverse pos-
session and there never has been any step taken for the fore-
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closure of the mortgage nor for any sale of the land as re-
quired by the law of Utah. Let us consider in addition thereto 
the very vital factors as to whether there could possibly be 
any adverse possession by the Investment Company. The testi-
mony of Mr. Ross Bray relative to t~e payment of taxes, 
(which we all understand and know to be a vital factor in the 
element of adverse possession) , shows that the taxes were 
never paid by the Investment Company, but that payment was 
made only by the Mortgage Company (p. 23) up until 1938, 
when the Mortgage Company ~ntered into a contract for the 
sale of the surface rights to Jay Larsen and thereafter neither 
company has paid any taxes whatsoever. Thereafter, to-wit, 
on the 4th day of February, 1942, the Investment Company 
gave. its Warranty Deed to said Larsen covering the surface 
rights, but prior to said date it does not appear that the In-
vestment Company ever exercised any claimed rights or did 
not act to show that it claimed any right to possession of said 
property. Another elemental factor in whether or not ad~ 
verse possession could accrue is the question of whether these 
foreign corporations doing business in Utah were available 
for suit by a resident within this state. The records· of the 
county clerk's office show that the last appointment of a resi· 
dent agent in Utah was in 1926 and none other until 1951 
We are advised and can substantiate by evidence the fact that 
the said resident agent appointed in 1926 left and departed 
from the state of Utah in 1928 leaving both corporations 
without resident agents and hence absolutely disqualified to 
do business in Utah from the period from 1928 to 1951. Of 
course, no adverse possession could be running in favor of 
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the non-qualified foreign corporation during the period of its 
disqualification. 
Reference has been made in our affidavit adverse to the 
proposed motion to set aside the default, to the fact that the 
corporate existence of both of these corporations that were 
organized in Colorado has terminated and that no amendments 
extending the life of said corporations has ever been filed with 
the County Clerk of Uintah County or with the Secretary 
of State of Utah. Particularly, the Investment Company is 
standing upon the asserted title in its name. This corpora-
tion was formed in 1901, and for a period of 20 years. 
Thus, its corporate existence expired in 1921 just a few months 
after the taking of the purported deed which was in fact only 
a mortgage. Again no adverse possession could be accruing 
in favor of this Investment Company in light of its expired 
existence since 1921. 
A reading _ of the proposed Answer and the numerous 
purported defenses asserted- therein makes it obvious that_ the_ 
Mortgage Company certainly makes no claim whatsoever to an 
ownership interest in the property at issue now before the 
Court. We therefore submit that in any event no reversal 
of the default could be made as to the Mortgage Company 
because no defense has been asserted on its behalf as to an 
ownership_ claim or interest in and to this property. It is 
obvious that such is not _and could not be asserted because 
of the fact that the abstract of title which was introduced as 
Exhibit CCA" in the original proceedings before this -court 
shows a conveyance, which is referred to in our affidavit now 
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in file herein, by the Mortgage Company to Joseph F. Yf arr 
and his wife, Elizabeth W arr, fully satisfying and discharging 
the purported mortgages that were claimed to be outstanding 
and . co.nveying the right, title and interest of the Mortgage 
Company back to the said Joseph F. Warr and Elizabeth Warr 
and their h~irs and assigns forever. 
From the foregoing it appears that the defendants were 
clearly not entitled to have the default set aside either on the 
basis of their original motion to set aside the same for sur-
prise, inadvertence or excusable neglect, or op. the basis of 
the motion to reconsider that denial made on May 24th. In 
this connection the attention of the Court is called to the 
fact that the motion to reconsider the ruling was not filed until 
11 days ~fter the docketing of the denial of the . motion. 
Under the provisions of Rule 52 (b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which is the only provision for amendment of find-
ings. and judgment that we are able to find, such a motion 
must be made within 10 days. Therefore, any of the supple-
mental affidavits submitted in connection with this motion 
to reconsider, if they had any probative value- which we 
maintain they have not, should not be considered by the Court 
for the reason that they were filed ~fter the time provided. 
The motion to set aside the judgment on the grounds of sur-
prise, inadvertence or excusable neglect was. therefore properly 
denied by the lower court. In fact, the facts are so clear that 
not only did the lower court not abuse its discretion in refus-
ing to set aside the judgment, but would have abused its 
discretion had it ordered such judgment set aside. 
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2 
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT FOR 
NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES SHOULD BE DENIED. 
(a) The Motion Was Not Timely. 
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides for the setting aside of judgments on certain stated 
grounds. This rule provides that the motion must be made 
within a reasonable time. On certain specific grounds it must 
be made within three months from the date of the judgment. 
In this case the default was enteretl on the 21st of August, 
1951 and the judgment complained of was entered on the 
31st day of August, 1951. The motion to set aside the judg-
ment for mis-joinder of parties was not filed until the 23rd 
day of May, 1952. According to their affidavit contained 
in the file, the defendant companies learned of the entry of 
judgment early in November of 1951. Thus the defendants 
waited 9 months after the entry of judgment and 6 months 
after they learned of the entry of judgment before filing 
this motion. Certainly this cannot be construed to be a reason-
able time and is clearly far in excess of the 3 months allowed 
under certain designated grounds. 
Constructive notice to all parties and interested persons 
was had by the recording of the Lis Pendens herein on June 
27, 1951. 
(b) There Was No Mis-Joinder of Parties. 
The plaintiffs are in agreement with the defendants that 
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a mis-joinder of parties results where an indispensable party 
is omitted·. However, it is clear from . the examination of the 
facts in this case that neither Jay Larsen nor Carter Oil Com-
pany were necessary or indispensable parties to the action. 
The defendants' position rests wholly upon the faulty premise 
that there is privity of title in the defendants and Jay Larsen 
and that any order defeating the defendants' title automatically 
defeats the title of Jay Larsen. They have stated this position 
numerous times in their bri~f as a basis for their vanous 
arguments. For example on page 59, it is stated: 
']t is, of course, clear in the case at bar that Jay 
Larsen's title is founded upon the defendants' title. 
A successful defense by Jay Larsen to the action would 
necessarily demonstrate that there was no cause of 
action against the defendants." 
Such is certainly not the case. In order to have privity of title 
not only must two parties claim through the same source, 
but their title must rest upon the same basis. Jay Larsen claims 
only the surface rights and the Van Kleecks claim only the oil, 
gas and mineral rights.. In this case it is true t~at both the 
defendants' title and Jay Larsen's title depend upon the deed 
from the Warrs to Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment Company. 
Jay Larsen, however, stands in an entirely different position 
in regard to this deed than do the defendants. The deed 
was apparently fair on its face and was properly recorded. 
Its invalidity arose from the existence of an agreement to re-
convey, which agreement, as was previously stated, makes 
an equitably mortgage out of the Investment Company's deed 
which was fair on its face. Such agreement to reconvey, 
however, not being recorded would render that deed a mort-
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gage only as against the parties having notice of the agree-
ment to reconvey. A bona fide purchaser of the surface 
rights in good faith for value, 'vhich Jay Larsen certainly was, 
\Yould not be chargeable \vith any defect in the deed resulting 
from the unrecorded instrument of which he had no knowl-
edge. 
Section 78-1-6, U.C.A., 1943 provides: 
({Every conveyance of real estate, and every instru-
ment . of \vriting setting forth an agreement to convey 
any real estate or whereby any real estate may be af-
fected, to operate ·as notice to third persons shall be 
proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner 
prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which such real estate 
is situated, but shall be valid and binding between 
the parties thereto without such proof, acknowledg-
ment, certification or record, and as to all other persons 
who have had actual notice." 
In this case the deed was recorded, however the agree-
ment to reconvey was not, and so while the agreement to 
reconyey is binding as be tween the parties thereto and all 
who had actual notice, it would not be binding t;lS between 
the plaintiffs in this action and Jay Larsen. 
Jones on Mortgages, Sec. 284, states: 
HAn absolute deed with a defeasance passes the legal 
. title to the property even in states where it is held 
that a mortgage in the usual form does not pass the 
title." 
Therefore, the Van Kleecks, even though the deed 1s 
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subject to an . unrecorded agreement to recovery, obtained 
title to the property which they could pass to an innocent pur-
chaser without notice. This exact situation is· discussed by 
Glen or Mortgages, Sec. 10.1, where concerning the rights 
of a bona fide purchaser, the author states: 
((There are many possibilities in this regard, and 
they are helped OJ.lt, in our country, by the recording 
acts, of which we shall say more in a later chapter. 
Typical for present purposes is the man who pur-
chases land on the faith of a title that, .on .the face of 
the record and for all he knows to the contrary, is 
vested free and clear in his vendor. Such a ·person as 
a bona fide purchaser is immune to the suit of a plain-
tiff who says that when he conveyed, the intention was 
merely to secure a ·debt, and there was a defeasance 
agreement to that effect, which for some reason was 
not recorded. The defendant as a bona fide purchaser 
is protected from the claim and the plaintiff must look 
elsewhere for redress." 
See also Meehan v. Forrester, 52 N. Y. 277 and Mooney v. 
Byrne, 57 N.Y. 163. 
• In th~ case of Wiese v. Wiese, 217 Pac. 994, the Supreme 
Court of Washington stated: 
t tlf the deed be regarded as a mortgage as between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants, the sale of the land 
by the plaintiffs to a bona fide purchaser vested good 
title in them because of their being innocent putchas-
ers. " 
Therefore, although the plaintiffs were entitled to a 
decree quieting title in them as against any interest in the 
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property still remaining in the Van Kleeck companies, they 
\vould not be entitled to have a decree binding upon any 
bona fide purchasers to whom the Van Kleecks had conveyed. 
In this category is Jay Larsen. The plaintiffs were not entitled 
to and sought no relief as against Jay Larsen. 
Section 104-57-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides 
in regard to default judgment and quiet title action as follows: 
ctThe judgment shall be conclusive against all the 
persons named in the summons and complaint who 
have been served-and against all such unknown per-
sons as stated in the complaint and summons who 
have been served by publication." 
This section clearly recognizes the fact that in quiet title 
actions there may be individuals having claims to the property 
who are not named as parties, or who have not been served 
in the action. Such, however, does not defeat the right of the 
plaintiff to have the title determined by a default judgment 
as between himself and the parties properly named and served-
in the action. There is a vast difference between an action 
broiight to reform an instrument of title and an action to 
quiet title. An action to reform an instrument of title would, 
of course, effect the rights of all persons claiming under such 
instrument of title, and they would be necessary parties. All 
of the cases cited by the defendants in their brief are cases of 
this type, as will be hereinafter pointed out. On the other hand, 
an action to quiet title does not ask for the changing of any 
instrument of record, but merely asks for the determination 
of the title as between the plaintiffs and the defendants named 
and served. 
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This rule is clearly stated in the Alabama case of Dake v. 
Inglis, 194 So. 673: 
llThe purpose of the proceeding is not to invest the 
Court with jurisdiction to sell or dispose of the title 
to the land, but merely to determine and settle the 
same as between the complainant and defendants. 
Therefore, the fact that there are others who might 
assert claims to the propery, who are not made parties, 
is not an obstacle to a final decree settling the title 
as between the parties to the bill. The decree is only 
conclusive against such as are made parties and their 
privies." 
Similar language is found _in the Florida case of Brooks 
v. Pryor, 189 So. 675, where an objection similar to the one 
in this case was made: 
lllt is next contested by counsel for appellant that 
it appears upon the record that interested parties in 
the subject matter of the litigation were not served with 
process and should be made parties before a final 
decree was entered * * * * The answer to this con-
tention is that the bill of complaint is one to quiet 
title and confirm title in the plaintiffs below and it is 
not a suit to reform a ~eed because of a mistake in 
the description of the lands ~onveyed.'' 
The decree in this action casts no cloud upon Jay Larsen's 
title. The deed from the Warrs to the Van Kleeck companies 
still stands unchanged upon the records. The decree in this 
action merely determined that as between the parties to this 
action, such deed was not a deed absolute, but an equitable 
mortgage. 
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Let us examine the cases cited by the defendants in sup-
port of their _position that the judgment constitutes a cloud 
on Jay Larsen, s title and that he is therefore an indispensable 
party. The first case cited by the defendants, Shields v. 
Barrow, 17 How. 130, was not a quiet title action at all, but 
a suit to rescind a contract. Certainly parties to the contract 
\vhose rights would have been affected by the recision were not 
parties to the action, and the Court therefore held a misjoinder. 
United States v. Central Pacific R. Co., 11 Fed. 449, also 
cited by the defendants was an action to vacate a patent 
issued by the United States Government. A grantee of the 
patentee was not made a party and the court held a misjoinder 
for the reason that a va<;ating of the patent would leave such 
grantee without any basis for his title. 
As has been pointed out above, there is no effort made in 
the quiet title action now before the Court to vacate or remove 
from the record the W arr to Van Kleeck deed through which 
Jay Larsen claims his title. The same is true of New Mexico 
v. Lane, 243 U. S. 53,, where the action seeks to restrain the 
issuance of a patent, which if not issued would have left 
keepers title without a basis. 
In South Penn Oil Co. v. Miller, 175 Fed. 729, there 
was an action to gain possession of an oil well and dispose 
of the lease monies thereunder to which monies a person not 
a party to the action had a claim of right. Obviously in that 
case the monies could not be property distributed without 
having all parties before the Court. 
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United States v. Bean, 25 3 Fed. 1, held that a purchaser 
of a tax sale was an indispensable party in an action to annul 
such tax sale as the annullment of the sale would leave his 
title without any legal support. 
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Hofstater, 32 Fed. (2) 184, is 
a suit to enjoin a trespass and in that case it was held that 
a prospective purchaser was not a party defendant. 
Miller v. Klasner, 140 Pac. 1107, which the defendants 
say is in point here, is decided on an entirely different point. 
There it was decided that the defendant named was not a 
real party in interest, but was merely an agent for Ellen Casey. 
Furthermore the suit was not one to quiet title, but to restrain 
the defendant from use of certain water. The Court held 
that the real party in interest was not the agent who was made 
defendant, but Ellen Casey, the defendant's principal. This 
case has no application at all to the case now before the court. 
In Vincent Oil Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 195 Fed. 434, 
an action was brought to actually annul a lease under which a 
person not made a party to the action claimed rights. There, 
had the lease been annulled, this party would have lost all 
its right and the Court properly held that such a party should 
be entitled to defend. 
Page v. Town of Gallup, 191 Pac. 460, and Egyptian 
Novaculite Co. v. Stevenson, 8 Fed. (2) 576 (CCA 8), are 
both cases where an attempt is made by a third party to annul 
a contract between two parties where only one of the other 
parties to the contract are made parties to the suit. 
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Ebell v. Bursinger, 70 Tex. 120, 8 S.W. 77, is an action 
to cancel a deed on the records, while Iron City Sav. Bank·v. 
Isaacsen, 164 S.E. 520, is a suit for an injunction to prevent 
the transfer of water stock on the books of a company. · · · 
Here we are not making any attempt to upset. any recor~ 
title. The deed from W arrs to Van Kleecks will still remain 
' ',· ' I ' , 
on the record. So Jar as the water stock is concerned, that: js 
already ip~ Jay Lar~.en's -name on the books of the company 
and no action is brought to change this record. . Once again 
we repeat-if Jay Larsen's rights were actually b~ing affected 
by this judgment then he w9uld perhaps be a necessa,ry party 
to the suit. Whether >or not _l;le is a _permissif?le party,.,~n view 
of the facts of the case, need not be here decided. It may , 
be that h~9- he applied in time, th~re. would be l).Othin.g wrong 
in letting him enter the suit for the purpose of adjudi~ati~g 
his rights. However, in ·view of the fact that· his rights are 
not adversely affected by the decree, there is _no ,5:on~eivable 
reason for upsetting the decree as between th.e plaintiff and 
defendant for thepu~pose of merely l~tting Larsen . come into 
the action. · 
- _.;_: 
3 
JAY LARSEN SHOULD NOT BEPERMITTEb.·to 
INTERVENE. 
(a) His Motion Was Not Timely. 
The first appearance of. Jay Larsen in th~ case was·· on 
~ay 23, 1952 when he filed a motion to set aside the, default 
45 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and to be permitted to intervene. This occurred some 9 months 
after the entry of th default judgment. We have ·already dis-
cussed in a preceding section of this brief the question of 
what is a reasonable time in which ti file a motion to set aside 
a default. The argument made there applies with equa~ force 
to the motion of Jay Larsen. If persons desiring to intervene 
in an action could fil~ a motion to have a judgment set aside 
and permit them to intervene at any time, there could never be 
a finality to any judgment. The losing party, in any law suit 
could always, at any time, upset a judgment by finding a party 
with some imagined interest in . the subject matter of a law 
suit already determined and have such party file a motion to 
intervene. Even if Jay Larsen had a right to intervene in this 
action, which we will hereafter show he has not, he has not 
acted promptly and his motion should be denied on that 
ground alone. 
(b) His Rights Are Not At Issue In This Action. 
At the time of filing the complaint in this action, counsel 
for the plaintiffs were well aware of the interest of Jay Larsen 
in the subject matter of this law suit. We knew that he had 
purchased the surface rights and had paid a consider~tion 
therefor. There was nothing to indicate that Jay Larsen had 
any knowledge of the existence of a reconveyance agreement. 
It therefore appeared that Jay Larsen was clearly a purchaser 
for value in good faith under a deed \vhich was in all respects 
fair on its face. We ·felt, therefore, that so far as the surface 
rights and the water stock were concerned, in fact so far as 
anything that Jay Larsen purported to purchase, his right 
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thereto \vas superior to the right of the Warrs. We felt that 
there \vas no purpose in joining Jay Larsen in the suit. Our 
sole purpose in th suit \Yas to try the issue of title as between 
the \\Tarrs and the \'an Kleecks and to quiet title in the W arrs 
as against the Van Kleecks. The law as it applies to the 
relative rights of the Warrs and Jay Larsen has been previously 
discussed. Jay Larsen's title is in exactly the same position as 
it was before this action was commenced. He has in no way 
been injured or prejudiced by the entry of the order in this 
case. 
(c) He Has Been Offered and Has Rejected All That He 
Could Obtain In The Action. 
Although it is clear that Jay Larsen has not been injured 
m this action, . in order to emphasize their position in this 
case and to clear up any possible question as to this matter, 
during the hearing on the motion the plaintiffs in open court 
offered to execute fo Jay Larsen a quit claim deed to the surface 
rights of the land and the water stock. At this hearing, Larsen 
was being represented by the same counsel representing the 
Van Kleeck companies. Counsel refused to accept this quit 
claim deed. This action clearly showed that Jay Larsen's ap-
pearance in this action is not a genuine and bona fide appear-
ance. He is merely a party manufactured by counsel for the 
VanKleeck companies and thrown in the case for the purpose 
of muddying the waters. If Jay Larsen honestly feels that 
there is any cloud on his title resulting from the judgment 
of the plaintiffs, why would he not welcome a deed from the 
plaintiffs in order to clear up this matter? The answer is 
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. t 
obvious-neither the attorneys for Jay Larsen nor the attorneys 
for Van Kleeck are one bit interested in the condition of Mr. 
Larsen's title. They are interested merely in causing confusion 
in the hope that it will lend weight to their attempt to set aside 
the default as to the Van Kleeck companies. 
As an excuse for refusing to accept the deed, they state 
that there has been no probate· of the W arrs' estate and that 
there may be persons with intervening interest. Of course, 
that situation has not been changed at all by the action in 
this case as none of these intervening interests have been in 
any way litigated. The only persons that could obtain any 
interest in the property as a result of the judgment in this law 
suit are the plaintiffs herein. Any interest which they might 
have obtained would be returned to Jay Larsen by the quit 
claim deed. If Jay Larsen were permitted to intervene in the 
action, he could get nothing more than a determination of his 
title as bet~een himself and the plaintiffs in this action. The 
decree could not determine his title as to persons not parties 
hereto. · As all of the persons and the plaintiffs. in the action 
have offered to quit claim to Larsen, he would get everything 
by a quit claim deed that he could obtain by the most favorable 
judgment that could be entered in his Javor if he were per-
mitted to intervene. 
IV 
THE POSITION OF CARTER OIL COMPANY. 
Carter Oil.Company stands in the same position as Jay 
Larsen. This company took its lease on the property in ques-
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tion on the basis of a deed on record which was fair on its 
face. This lease would therefore, under the authority cited 
above, take preference over the claims of the plaintiffs in this 
action. Regardless of what the relative rights of the plaintiffs 
and defendants in this rna y be as to the proceeds of such 
lease, the rights of Carter Oil Company under the lease are 
not changed by the decree in this case. This would be so even 
if the plaintiffs had not ratified the lease; however, in view 
of the fact that plaintiffs have ratified the lease, the Carter 
Oil Company does not stand to be hurt. The concern of the de-
fendants in this action for the welfare of the Carter. Oil 
Company would seem very amusing. Although Carter Oil Com-
pany has from the beginning had full knowledge of the facts of 
this suit, it has not seen fit to attempt to intervene in defense of 
its rights. The affidavit of Don Barr (R. 11) clearly shows that 
Carter Oil Company knew of the judgment on or before 
November 7, 1951. It also had constructive notice by the 
recording of the Lis Pendens in June of 1951. 
CONCLUSION 
The decisions of the Trial Court denying the motion of 
the defendants should be sustained. The rights of Jay Larsen 
and Carter Oil Company are not at issue in this case at all.. 
They are merely matters thrown in by the Van Kleeck com-
panies to confuse the issues. The sole questions before this 
court are--Did the taking of the judgment result from sur-
prise, inadvertence or excusable neglect and if so, have the 
Van Kleecks a meritorious defense? On the basis of the 
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authorities above cited, both of these, questions must be 
answered in the negative. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON, 
721 Cont'l Bank Bldg., 
~alt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
so 
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